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NUISANCE-VALUE PATENT SUITS: AN
ECONOMIC MODEL AND PROPOSAL
Ranganath Sudarshant
Abstract
Patent holding entities frequently approach companies with
vague allegations of patent infringement, offering a license in
exchange for a "nuisance" payment which amounts to less than the
cost of litigating a defense. Although accused infringers often have
strong arguments that the asserted patent claims are either invalid or
not infringed, most risk-averse companies opt to settle rather than
face the expensive, protracted, and uncertain prospect of litigation.
Such "nuisance" patent settlements, however, defy their name-often
amounting to millions of dollars.
Despite a wealth of analysis in the tort context of the nuisance-
value settlement problem, there has been no comparable analysis in
the patent context. This Article presents substance to that void with an
economic model that explains the dynamics of nuisance-value patent
litigation, as well as the background conditions in patent law which
facilitate these dynamics. After exploring proposed solutions from the
tort context, the economic model is used to explain why a unique
solution is necessary for patent suits. Finally, this Article proposes a
narrowly-tailored procedural mechanism which will allow district
courts to liberally grant a stay of the infringement phase of a patent
suit pending completion of an expedited validity phase. Such a
mechanism will provide economic incentives for defendants to litigate
against nuisance patents rather than opt for nuisance settlements.
t J.D., University of California, Berkeley; B.S., M.S., Stanford University;
rsudarsh@cs.stanford.edu. Law Clerk for Judge Randall Rader of the United States Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit, 2008-09. 1 am grateful to Professor Robert Merges for his
thoughtful reviews of an initial proposal for this paper.
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INTRODUCTION
Today's corporate Chief Executive Officers and Chief Financial
Officers are keenly aware of the threat that big-ticket patent
infringement poses to the bottom line. However, they are not attuned
to a smaller, yet significant threat which is a growing concern for the
office of the General Counsel. Beneath the radar of newspaper
headlines and Congressional floor speeches addressing patent reform,
nuisance-value patent suits are a daily fact of life for most corporate
legal departments.
The pattern is familiar. Corporations receive a letter in the mail
from a patent holding company inviting a "discussion" regarding the
company's patent portfolio. The corporation allegedly infringes this
portfolio, and the holding company invites it to participate in a
"licensing program." The holding company contacts dozens of
potential defendants in this manner, offering preferable licensing fees
to companies who settle early. The holding company pegs the cost of
settlement below the cost of defending against an infringement suit; a
number which can often reach into the millions. Faced with a pure
business decision, most corporate legal departments opt for the
"nuisance" settlement, even when there are meritorious defenses. In
the words of one industry veteran, such suits are corporate America's
latest "slip and fall."'
This paper is the first academic attempt to analyze nuisance-
value patent litigation. Part I addresses the foundational question of
what constitutes a nuisance-value patent suit. It then presents an
economic model which reflects the unique litigation and business
strategies of nuisance patent plaintiffs. This model reveals the central
economic reality which enables nuisance-value patent suits to be
brought-a litigation cost imbalance that favors plaintiffs over
defendants.
Part II explores why nuisance patent litigation is a matter of
concern for those interested in innovation and a robust patent system.
This section aims to establish that nuisance patent suits threaten vital
gatekeepers of patent quality.
Part III examines the background conditions of the U.S. patent
system which enable nuisance patent plaintiffs to achieve success. An
understanding of these conditions, and their relation to the economic
I. Sheri Qualters, More Firms Fight Nuisance Patent Claims, BOSTON BUS. J., June 6,
2003, available at http://boston.bizjournals.com/boston/stories/2003/06/09/story3.html.
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model of Part I, is critical to developing proposals which ameliorate
the problem of nuisance patent suits.
Part IV examines scholarly treatment of nuisance-value
settlements in the field of tort law. This examination reveals that
existing proposals are ill-adapted to address the specific problem of
nuisance-value patent suits.
Part V advances a proposal to curtail nuisance-value patent
litigation abuse. Under this proposal, at the request of a defendant, the
court stays the infringement phase of a suit while first addressing the
issue of the patent's validity in a condensed time frame. This proposal
alters the economic dynamic upon which nuisance-value patent
plaintiffs rely by allowing patent defendants to concentrate their
resources on invalidity defenses while holding off the burdensome
and unequal expenses of infringement discovery.
I. WHAT IS NUISANCE-VALUE PATENT LITIGATION?
Two major deficiencies handicap any analysis of nuisance-
settlement behavior in private civil litigation. First, there is a lack of
publicly available information about settlements. A vast majority of
litigants agree to confidentiality agreements that prevent
dissemination of financial details.2 Second, there is difficulty in
making an ex post determination of what constitutes a nuisance
settlement, even when financial details are forthcoming. As a result of
these analytical handicaps, this Article will be primarily theoretical,
placing greater emphasis on economic models than on statistical
observation.
A. A Working Definition
This Article relies on nuisance-value patent litigation having
three specific and necessary definitional conditions.
1. First, the patent holder offers a settlement (or license)
figure which is significantly less than the cost of defending
the suit through the discovery phase of a trial.
2. See, e.g., Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Chiles Power Supply, Inc., 332 F.3d 976,
980 (6th Cir. 2003) ("[s]ecrecy of settlement terms . . . [is] a well-established American
litigation practice." (quoting Palmieri v. New York, 779 F.2d 861, 865 (2d Cir. 1985)). Mark
Lemley has, however, recently suggested requiring publication of all patent license terms as a
way to improve accurate valuation of patent rights. See Mark A. Lemley & Nathan Myhrvold,
How to Make a Patent Market, (Stanford Law & Econ. Olin, Working Paper No. 347, 2007),
available at http://ssm.com/abstract- 1012726.
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2. Second, this settlement amount does not correspond to
traditional measures of patent damages, i.e., reasonable
royalty or lost profits.
3
3. Third, the plaintiff seeks to avoid litigation because of a
sufficiently high probability that the asserted claims are a)
invalid, or b) not infringed by the defendant's products.
This definition recognizes that a suit is not necessarily a nuisance
suit just because the offered settlement amount is less than the cost of
defense. For example, the second prong of the definition excludes
situations where a defendant's infringement may have been so minor
that a license would have been worth less than the cost of asserting
the patent in litigation.4 Similarly, the third prong of the definition
leaves out scenarios where a plaintiffs validity and infringement
contentions are meritorious, but a steep discount may have been given
to the defendant for any number of reasons.
B. Insights from an Economic Model
Let us assume a hypothetical plaintiff and defendant. Define the
following variables:
V: The maximum amount of damages that Plaintiff can hope to
reap from Defendant for infringement of Plaintiffs patent.
p: The probability (O<p<l) that both a) Plaintiffs patent will
withstand Defendant's challenges to the patent's validity,5
and b) Defendant infringes Plaintiff s patent. 6
Cp: Plaintiffs prospective cost of litigation, including
attorney's fees, court costs, expert fees, internal litigation
costs, etc.
CD: Defendant's prospective cost of litigation, including
attorney's fees, court costs, expert fees, internal litigation
costs, etc.
3. Damages for patent infringement are governed by 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2000).
4. 1 refer to "minor" infringement here as a situation where a patent right is legitimately
infringed, but where the resultant damages are so small that litigation is not worthwhile. This
contrasts with nuisance suits, where, as per our definition, infringement and/or validity is
questionable.
5. Common invalidity challenges include anticipation under 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2000 &
Supp. II 2004), obviousness under 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2000 & Supp. IV 2006), and lack of
enablement under 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2000). For a thorough treatment of patent validity, see
ROBERT PATRICK MERGES AND JOHN FITZGERALD DUFFY, PATENT LAW AND POLICY: CASES
AND MATERIALS (3d ed. 2002).
6. Probability p is a compound figure, arrived at by multiplying the probability of
infringement by the probability of validity.
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NS: The nuisance amount which Plaintiff can offer Defendant to
resolve/prevent litigation.
From the plaintiffs perspective, it is economically worthwhile to
bring suit if:
1. Cp < pV
That is, if the expected value of the litigation (p multiplied by V)
is greater than the plaintiffs litigation costs, it stands to gain from the
lawsuit. Put differently, the plaintiffs expected outcome from this
lawsuit will be:
2.pV- Cp
Seen from the defendant's perspective, the suit bears an expected
value (a loss) of:
3. p(V+CD) + (1-p)(CD)
Accordingly, for a settlement or license amount, NS, to be
economically attractive to the defendant, the following relationship
must hold true:
4. NS < [p(V+CD) + (1-p)(CD)]
Where,
5. lim (pV- Cp} = -Cp
p--* O
Therefore, as a patent's chance p of withstanding invalidity and
noninfringement attacks gets lower, the plaintiffs expected value of
litigation reaches the cost of litigation, Cp, even when potential
damages V are large.7 As a result, nuisance patent plaintiffs generally
prefer not to litigate. From this fundamental insight, we can make
several additional observations.
1. Maximizing the Defendant's Cost of Defense
Referring to equation 3, which expresses the expected outcome
of litigation for the defendant, we can observe:
6. lim {p(V+CD) + (J-p)(CD)} = CD
p--->O
As p approaches zero, the expected value of the litigation for the
defendant effectively boils down to the cost of defense, CD. In other
words, as it becomes more and more unlikely that the asserted patent
is either infringed or valid, the defendant is less likely to be required
7. p is rarely, if ever, actually zero. The reasons for this fact, as well as its implications,
are discussed infra in Part I.B.3.
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to pay damages, and the expected loss amounts primarily to the cost
of defense. Applying this to equation 4, we can observe:
7. lim NS = CD
p ---> O
As p approaches zero, the nuisance amount NS, which the
plaintiff can demand to make the dispute go away, is bounded only by
CD, the cost of defense.8
This bound on NS has one clear implication; a nuisance patent
plaintiff has every incentive to increase CD, for doing so directly
increases NS. No doubt, in all litigation, a plaintiff has an incentive to
maximize CD, but the effect of doing so is peculiarly important in
nuisance cases where p is low. This can be seen by considering cases
where p is higher, i.e., non-nuisance cases, where we can observe:
8. lim (p(V+CD) + (1-p)(CD)} = V+CD
p--*
When p gets higher, CD becomes less important since V, the
maximum amount of damages, often dwarfs the cost of defense in
patent cases. 9 It follows that NS in non-nuisance patent cases is not
bound by CD, as it is in nuisance cases, which is why nuisance-value
settlements are not expected in non-nuisance patent cases.
Nuisance patent plaintiffs can increase the cost of defense in a
number of ways. First, they can take advantage of the liberal standard
for discovery in the Fed. R. of Civ. P. by aggressively demanding
discovery on a broad range of topics. 10 As long as discovery requests
appear "reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible
evidence,"" they are permissible, and the defendant must produce
evidence under penalty of contempt.
Plaintiffs can also assert infringement of multiple patents to
inflict high litigation costs on defendants. When nuisance plaintiffs
8. The fact that S is bound by CD instead of V explains the second prong of my
definition of nuisance plaintiffs. See supra Part I.A. Only where the value p is sufficiently low
can one expect settlement demands to correspond not to traditional measures of patent damages,
but merely to the cost of defense.
9. For example, the median damages award in patent cases in 2005 was approximately
$9 million. See ARON LEVKO ET AL., A CLOSER LOOK: 2008 PATENT LITIGATION STUDY:
DAMAGES AWARDS, SUCCESS RATES, AND TIME-TO-TRIAL 2 chart 2A (2008), available at
http://www.pwc.com/extweb/pwcpublications.nsf/docid/EBC 144CF6220C I E785257424005F9
A2B/$file/2008_patent litigationstudy.pdf. For a discussion of the typical (lower) costs of
defense in patent litigation, see infra Part Il.A.
10. FED R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1) ("Parties may obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged
matter that is relevant to any party's claim or defense ... .
II. Id.
NUISANCE-VALUE PATENT SUITS
own several patents, but only a few are particularly relevant to the
business of the defendant, they can nonetheless assert all patents that
are remotely relevant as long as they satisfy the minimum pre-filing
investigation requirements of Fed. R. of Civ. Pro. 11.12 Each
additional patent-in-suit requires the defendant to expend more money
and effort in interpreting the claims, searching for invalidating prior
art, and hiring experts to opine on non-infringement.
Another notable nuisance technique is choosing to file suit in a
jurisdiction that is inconvenient for the defendant. Under the federal
patent venue statute, a plaintiff can bring an infringement suit either
"in the judicial district where the defendant resides, or where the
defendant has committed acts of infringement and has a regular and
established place of business."' 3 The federal general venue statute
provides that a corporate defendant is deemed to reside in "any
judicial district in which it is subject to personal jurisdiction.",14 The
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has interpreted these statutes
to allow patent infringement suits to be brought in any jurisdiction
where the defendant has sufficient contacts under the Constitution-a
traditionally low threshold.1 5  By bringing suit in far-flung,
perceivably-plaintiff-friendly "magnet jurisdictions,"', 6  nuisance
plaintiffs can satisfy the minimum Constitutional venue requirements
while subjecting defendants to the cost and inconvenience of having
to litigate in a distant location.
2. Minimizing the Plaintiffs Litigation Costs
Since both plaintiffs and defendants face prospective litigation
costs, to the extent that a plaintiff can minimize Cp in ways that a
defendant cannot minimize CD, a unique tactical advantage can be
reaped. Indeed, in nuisance suits, where p is low by definition,
12. For an example of the difficulty of obtaining sanctions against a patent plaintiff for
violating Rule 11, see infra note 60.
13. 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b) (2000).
14. 28 U.S.C. § 1391 (2000).
15. See VE Holding Corp. v. Johnson Gas Appliance Co., 917 F.2d 1574 (Fed. Cir.
1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 922 (1991).
16. For example, Justice Antonin Scalia has called the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Texas a "renegade jurisdiction[]" for its pro-plaintiff tendencies. See
Transcript of Oral Argument at 10-11, eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388
(2006) (No. 05-130), available at
http://www.supremecourtus.gov/oral arguments/argument transcripts/05- 130.pdf.
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plaintiffs must minimize Cp in order to maximize their expected value
of litigation. 7
One way plaintiffs minimize Cp is by using contingency fee
arrangements. A contingency fee arrangement is one in which an
attorney does not charge legal fees to a plaintiff until and unless a
favorable outcome is reached.1 8 A typical solicitation by a firm which
uses contingency fees appears as follows:
Your patent is your property; it's your right to defend it. The
problem is, most legal firms will make you pay all of the upfront
costs to take your case, regardless of the outcome .... Our firm
takes a different approach to defending your patent rights. We'll
offer our legal services to you on a value-billing basis, which
means we will pay the costs upfront and charge you only if we win
your case .... Don't be intimidated if you feel someone-whether
it is an individual or a large company-has violated your patent.
Our resources and experience in patent cases allows us to defend
your patent against offenders of any size. 19
Standard contingency fees are sizeable, typically at least one-
third in cases settled before trial and often more than one half of the
net recovery in cases which go to trial.20 Nonetheless, contingency
arrangements are critical to the success of nuisance plaintiffs. For one,
they allow a plaintiff to defer costs. A nuisance plaintiff who has
agreed to a contingency fee enjoys an obvious tactical advantage over
its adversary, the accused infringer, who must stay current with
expensive legal fees. Contingency arrangements also allow nuisance
plaintiffs to mitigate the grim reality of a low p value, since the
plaintiff will not have to pay an excessive legal bill if it loses in
litigation.
Another strategy used to minimize Cp is the practice of suing a
large number of defendants together in the same action. By naming
multiple defendants in the same complaint, nuisance patent plaintiffs
can lower their average cost, Cp, per suit. Although defendants can
17. The expected value of litigation for a plaintiff is pV-Cp, from Equation 2, supra Part
1.B.
18. See generally, Herbert M. Kritzer, The Wages of Risk: The Returns of Contingency
Fee Legal Practice, 47 DEPAUL L. REV. 267, 270 (1998).
19. Posting of Peter Lattman to WALL ST. J. LAW BLOG,
http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2007/11/09/law-blog-advertisement-of-the-day-trolling-for-patent-
plaintiffs/ (Nov. 9, 2007).
20. Lester Brickman, ABA Regulation of Contingency Fees: Money Talks, Ethics Walks,
65 FORDAM L. REV. 247, 268 (1996).
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band together to amortize certain costs, 2 1 most costs of litigation, such
as responses to discovery requests and preparation of witnesses
relating to infringement contentions, are not divisible from the
perspective of accused infringers. From the standpoint of the nuisance
patent plaintiff, however, many litigation costs are substantially the
22same whether there is one defendant or many.
Immunity to countersuit is yet another tactical advantage enjoyed
by nuisance plaintiffs. When making projections regarding the
expected outcome of bringing a patent suit, most plaintiffs must
account for the cost of having to litigate counter allegations of patent
infringement brought by the defendant. Nuisance plaintiffs, however,
who almost always exist solely for the purpose of enforcing a patent
portfolio, have no ongoing business operations which subject them to
the risk of a countersuit. Thus, when forecasting a prospective figure
for Cp, nuisance plaintiffs need not account for any projected
expenses associated with defending against patent countersuits.
3. Maximizing the Value of V to Increase NS
In equation 7, we observed that a defendant's expected outcome
approaches the cost of defense, CD, as p approaches zero, as it does in
nuisance cases. It is important to note, however, that p never actually
reaches zero. As further discussed above in Part III, the statutory
presumption of validity combined with the flexible nature of claim
scope interpretation, means that even the worst patents have a fighting
chance in court. Accordingly, the value of V is still important in
determining the upper limit of NS, the nuisance amount which a
plaintiff can demand. To use a numerical example, let us assume a
situation where the following values are true:
p=.I
CD = $2 million
V = $10 million
21. Defendants in patent cases often create "Joint Defense Groups" or "Common Interest
Groups" to share in certain costs, such as expert witnesses, prior art searches, etc. See Howard
M. Erichson, Informal Aggregation: Procedural and Ethical Implications of Coordination
Among Counsel in Related Lawsuits, 50 DUKE L.J. 381, 403 (2000).
22. Nuisance patent plaintiffs often file "boiler-plate" or "cookie-cutter" complaints
which include virtually identical, bare-bones allegations for different defendants. See, e.g.,
Xenia P. Kobylarz, Judge Sanctions Firm for Filing 'Cookie-Cutter' Patent Infringement
Complaints, THE RECORDER, Oct. 18, 2006, available at
http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id= 1161075917644.
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Applying these numbers to equation 4 above, we derive the
following:
NS < [($lOM+$2M) + (1-.1 )($2M)];
NS < $3M
Since the expected value to the defendant is $3 million, the
nuisance plaintiff can offer any amount up to $3 million for the
defendant to obtain an efficient resolution.
If we keep all other values the same, but now double the
potential damages, V, to $20 million, the following holds true:
NS < [($20M+$2M) + (1-.1)($2M)];
NS < $4M
Doubling V in this example, results in an increase in the upper
bound of NS of $1 million. Generally, increasing a defendant's
projected estimate of V palpably escalates the price at which a
defendant is willing to agree to a nuisance settlement.
Plaintiffs can increase a defendant's estimate of V by accusing a
defendant's entire system of infringement, rather than merely the
relevant component within that system. This strategy has received
doctrinal sanction from the Federal Circuit by way of the "entire
market value rule." 23 The rule permits recovery of damages "based on
the value of the patentee's entire apparatus containing several features
when the patent-related feature is the 'basis for customer demand."'
24
As one Silicon Valley executive describes it, patent plaintiffs often
take great liberty with the rule, phrasing settlement offers "in terms of
a percentage royalty based on the total selling price of [our] products,
even when the scope of the patent or patents extends to only a
relatively insignificant feature of the device."
25
Moreover, nuisance plaintiffs take advantage of the entire market
value rule by suing end-user device makers rather than original
equipment manufacturers (OEM's). For example, a nuisance plaintiff
who holds a patent on a hard-drive component will be able to
implicate a higher V if it pursues the computer maker who bundles the
23. Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co., 56 F.3d 1538, 1549 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc).
24. Id.
25. Patent Reform: The Future ofAmerican Innovation: Hearing Before the S. Comm. On
the Judiciary, 110th Cong. (2007) (statement of Mary E. Doyle, Senior Vice President and
General Counsel, Palm, Inc.), available at
http://judiciary.senate.gov/hearings/testimony.cfm?id=2803&wit-id=6507.
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hard drive into a deliverable system, rather than the OEM who
actually manufactured the hard drive.
26
II. NUISANCE-VALUE PATENT SUITS UNDERMINE
INNOVATION AND THE PATENT SYSTEM
To a company facing a patent infringement suit in which the
plaintiff offers a settlement for less than the cost of defense,
disposition of the matter may well be a mere nuisance. To the patent
system and the market for innovation as a whole, however, nuisance-
value patent settlements have a cumulatively negative effect that
should not be overlooked.
A. Discouragement of beneficial litigation
As academic commentators have observed, the U.S. Patent and
Trademark Office (PTO) is too understaffed and overworked to
adequately scrutinize each patent application in the examination
phase.27 By late 2007, the PTO had a backlog of 760,000 patent
applications to review, and the average time it took to address those
filings ranged from 25 months to more than 32 months.28 Assigned
production quotas for applications put increased pressure on PTO
patent examiners to review and complete applications quickly. 2' As a
result, their review of applications is often less than thorough, and the
PTO routinely issues bad patents.
Given the flawed nature of patent examination, the litigation
process is the real crucible in which to test a patent's validity and
scope.3° Once litigation begins, a defendant has a powerful economic
26. The "entire market value rule" is a prominent target of reform in the ongoing
Congressional patent reform debate. See infra Part IV.A.
27. See generally ADAM B. JAFFE & JOSH LERNER, INNOVATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS:
How OUR BROKEN PATENT SYSTEM IS ENDANGERING INNOVATION AND PROGRESS, AND WHAT
TO DO ABOUT IT 133-73 (2004).
28. Andrew Noyes, CongressDailyAM-Judiciary-Subcommittee Grills PTO Director On
Patent Backlog, Morale, CONGRESS DAILY, Feb. 28, 2008,
http://www.nationaljoumal.com/congressdaily/am_20080228_5.php.
29. For a discussion of the problems surrounding production quotas in the PTO, see
Stephen Barr, Backlog, Quotas Overwhelm Patent Examiners. WASH. POST, Oct. 8, 2007, at
DO 1, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2007/l 0/07/AR2007100701199_pf.html.
30. Mark Lemley has argued that strengthening the examination process at the PTO
would be inefficient, since such a small percentage of patents end up becoming the subject of
litigation. Instead, Lemley argues, since litigated patents are the patents that really matter,
strengthening judicial inquiry into validity during litigation is more worthwhile. See Mark A.
Lemley, Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 1495, 1501-02 (2001). On
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incentive to unearth evidence that would invalidate the patent in
question; a far greater incentive than the PTO employee who
examined a patent application before issuance.3 1 Litigation is thus one
of the main gatekeepers of patent quality.
A defendant's natural economic incentive to engage in this
gatekeeping function is turned upside down when a patent plaintiff
offers a nuisance-value settlement. Typically speaking, a defendant's
cost of discovering invalidating evidence and presenting it to the
Court, though high in absolute terms, is small compared to the
potential liability of an adverse verdict. In terms of the model above:
CD< V
This means a defendant typically has an incentive to spend CD
(i.e., to litigate) to avoid the possibility of paying V. However, when a
defendant is presented with a nuisance-value settlement, it can limit
its liability to NS. Since NS is bounded by CD,32 however, a defendant
has a strong incentive to merely pay NS (i.e., to not litigate) rather
than spend CD. A low-cost settlement can be far more attractive than a
prolonged legal battle, despite the defendant's meritorious arguments
of an invalid or impermissibly broad patent.
Nuisance settlements have implications for future litigants as
well. 33 Since the landmark case of Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc.
v. University of Illinois Foundation,34 the Supreme Court has held that
an accused infringer can non-mutually plead collateral estoppel when
facing an infringement claim on a patent already declared invalid in a
proceeding against another defendant. 3 Accordingly, a defendant
with strong invalidity defenses who nevertheless succumbs to a
nuisance-value settlement deprives all prospective future defendants
who might have benefited from a preclusive invalidity finding.
the other hand, Robert Merges and Joseph Farrell have advocated patent opposition procedures
as a middle ground solution to deal with poor examination at the PTO and the expense of district
court litigation. See Joseph Farrell & Robert P. Merges, Incentives to Challenge and Defend
Patents: Why Litigation Won't Reliably Fix Patent Office Errors and Why Administrative Patent
Review Might Help, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 943, 964 (2004).
31. Academics have estimated that a patent examiner, on average, spends no more than
eighteen hours examining each patent. See John R. Thomas, Collusion and Collective Action in
the Patent System: A Proposal for Patent Bounties, 2001 U. ILL. L. REv. 305, 314.
32. See supra Part I.B, Equation 7.
33. See Robert P. Merges, As Many as Six Impossible Patents Before Breakfast: Property
Rights for Business Concepts and Patent System Reform, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 577, 592-93
(1999) (discussing the societal costs of bad patents that are allowed to stay in force).
34. Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v. Univ. of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313 (1971).
35. Id. at 350.
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B. Effect on Accurate Valuation of Intellectual Property Rights
A patent is an exclusionary grant, providing to its holder the
right to "exclude others from making, using, offering for sale, or
selling the invention., 36 Thus, to the extent a patent can be valued,
that value reflects the patent holder's ability to prevent others from
practicing the patent's claims. The patent statute requires an adjudged
infringer to place a value on the exclusionary scope of a patent by
paying "damages adequate to compensate for the infringement, but in
no event less than a reasonable royalty for the use made of the
invention by the infringer., 37 In the economic model in Part I, a
defendant's projection of this value was labeled as V.
When an accused infringer disposes of litigation for a nuisance
amount, NS, it frustrates the statutory metric of patent valuation. As
seen above in Equation 7, nuisance settlements correlate primarily to
the cost of defense, CD. Thus, when a plaintiff extracts a nuisance
settlement from an accused infringer, the infringer has not valued the
patent according to the monetary value of the patent's exclusionary
scope, V. According to first principles, a patent's value ought not be
controlled by the auxiliary metric of how much it costs to defend
against it in an infringement suit. The framers of the U.S. Constitution
envisioned the patent system as securing exclusive patent rights for
inventors "[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts." 38
Thus, at its core, every patent reflects a quid pro quo between society,
who grants the exclusive patent right, and the inventor, who provides
a useful and novel innovation. Nuisance-value patent settlements,
where dubious patents are rewarded according to a calculus divorced
from the patent's useful worth, frustrate the very statutory and
Constitutional bases of the patent grant.
Nuisance patent plaintiffs exploit the flawed valuation inherent
in nuisance settlements in two primary ways. The first is by sending
not-so-subtle signals to future accused infringers. Consider one
notable plaintiff s press release after its 40th successful settlement:
[Accused infringer's] purchase of a MMP license is yet another
example of the widespread use of MMP Portfolio technology...
All producers of microprocessor-based products and dependent
services should be placing high priority on the purchase of a
license for the fundamental MMP Portfolio technologies to reduce
36. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1) (2000).
37. 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2000).
38. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
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related financial exposure. The sweeping scope of applications
using MMP Portfolio design techniques continues to encourage the
world's leading manufacturers of end user products from around
the globe to become MMP Portfolio licensees.39
By touting the success of their enforcement efforts on their
websites and issuing press releases each time a defendant agrees to a
settlement, nuisance plaintiffs inform future accused infringers that
the patents in question are potent and not worth litigating against.
A second way in which nuisance plaintiffs capitalize on flawed
valuations involves established law regarding reasonable royalty
damages. As discussed above, the patent statute mandates that an
adjudged infringer must pay, at a minimum, a "reasonable royalty" to
the patent holder.40 In a decades-old line of precedent emerging from
a New York district court case, courts consider a set of fifteen factors
in determining an appropriate reasonable royalty, the very first of
which is "the royalties received by the patentee for the licensing of
the patent in suit, proving or tending to prove an established
royalty. ' 4l Since courts place emphasis on the "going rate," as it were,
accused infringers cannot ignore the effect of prior nuisance
settlements. Thus, nuisance settlements boost a plaintiffs minimum
demand in future negotiations, further inflating the value of the bad
patent in question.
III. ASPECTS OF PATENT LAW THAT ENCOURAGE
NUISANCE-VALUE SETTLEMENTS
The previous sections have established a working definition and
economic model of nuisance patent suits and have analyzed the
negative effects of these suits using that model. This section examines
the unique background conditions that enable nuisance patent
plaintiffs to extract their tolls.
A. The High Cost of Patent Litigation
Perhaps the greatest factor contributing to the existence of
nuisance-value patent suits is the high cost of patent litigation. The
greater the cost of defending a suit, the more a company will pay to
39. Press Release, Alliacense, Mattel Becomes 40th Licensee, Setting a Major Milestone
in Moore Microprocessor PatentTM Licensing Program, (Feb. 25, 2008), available at
http://www.alliacense.comi/PressReleaseDetails.aspx?PresslD=69.
40. § 284.
41. Georgia-Pacific v. U.S. Plywood Corp., 318 F. Supp. 1116, 1120 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
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avoid litigation altogether. In 2001, the median cost to litigate a patent
case with $1 million to $25 million at risk was almost $1.5 million.42
By 2003, this amount had increased to $2 million.43 As the amount at
risk increases, litigation becomes more expensive. In cases with more
than $25 million at risk, the litigation costs were almost $4 million in
2003.44
The pre-trial discovery process in patent litigation, in particular,
is both technically complex and expensive. Discovery in patent
matters proceeds simultaneously on two primary fronts: validity and
infringement. With regard to validity, both parties must develop their
respective cases as to whether the patents are valid in light of prior
inventions which were publicly known prior to the date of invention.4 5
Both parties must conduct extensive searches, often on a global scale,
for articles and witnesses that can establish the validity or invalidity
of the patents in suit. Both parties must retain experts to opine on the
level of ordinary skill in the art of the invention, the scope and content
of relevant prior art, and the validity of the claims in light of these
factors.
However, the onus of discovery production, with regard to
infringement, is largely on the defendant in nuisance suits. Under Fed.
R. of Civ. Pro. 34, a party may serve unlimited requests to "produce
and permit the requesting party or its representative to inspect, copy,
test, or sample... documents or electronically stored information" or
"tangible things." 46 For example, a patent plaintiff may request the
following for production with regard to the issue of infringement:
All documents reflecting the research, design, development, and
manufacture of the accused infringing product; All engineering
specifications, memoranda, reports and evaluations of the accused
infringing product or methods; All flow charts, pseudo code and
computer source code for the [relevant] features of the accused
product or method; All documents reflecting the advertising,
marketing and sale of the accused infringing documents; All
documents filed with Government agencies regarding the accused
42. AIPLA, REPORT OF THE ECONOMIC SURVEY 2001, 84 tbl.22 (2001).
43. AIPLA, REPORT OF THE ECONOMIC SURVEY 2003,93 tbl.22 (2003).
44. Id. at 94 tbl.22.
45. 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2000).
46. FED. R. Civ. P. 34(a).
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product or method, including any SEC, FDA or other regulatory
filings.
47
Indeed, a defendant's entire business can be implicated by
broadly crafted discovery requests. The cost of finding such
documents, collecting them, and analyzing them for possible privilege
can be astronomical. Since the infringement phase of a patent case
deals nearly exclusively with the defendant's actions and products,
the plaintiff enjoys being in the position of demanding instead of
producing discovery.
In the words of one district court judge whose docket is heavy
with patent nuisance suits, "burgeoning litigation costs have distorted
patent markets by significantly discouraging potential patent
challenges, hence distorting competition to a degree beyond that
justified by the intrinsic strength or merit of the patent., 48 The direct
effects of these "burgeoning" costs can be seen by referring to our
economic model from Part I. In Equation 7, we observed that the
value that a nuisance plaintiff can demand of an accused infringer,
NS, is bounded only by CD, the cost of defense. Any increase in CD
accrues directly to the nuisance plaintiff in the form of a higher value
for NS.
B. The Statutory Presumption of Patent Validity and the High
Burden of Proving Invalidity
The very language of the U.S. Patent Act establishes that once a
patent has been granted by the PTO, a) "a patent shall be presumed
valid ' 49 and b) "the burden of establishing invalidity of a patent or
any claim thereof shall rest on the party asserting such invalidity."
50
The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which hears all appeals
from patent suits, has consistently interpreted this statute as requiring
a challenger to furnish "clear and convincing evidence" that a patent
was improperly granted. 51 With such a high burden for a patent
47. ALLAN M. SOOBERT, DISCOVERY ISSUES IN PATENT LITIGATION 13 (2005),
http://www.skadden.com/content/Publications/Publicationsl I 190.pdf.
48. T.S. Ellis, III, Distortion of Patent Economics by Litigation Costs, CASRIP SYMP.
PUB. SERIES, July 2005, at 22, 23, available at
http://www.law.washington.edu/casrip/Symposium/Number5/pub5atcl3.pdf.
49. 35 U.S.C. § 282 (2000).
50. Id.
51. Pfizer, Inc. v. Apotex, Inc., 480 F.3d 1348, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2007). For a history of
federal courts' interpretation of the standard of establishing invalidity, see Doug Lichtman &
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defendant to prove invalidity, all patent defendants begin the
litigation process disadvantaged.
The presumption of validity and the clear and convincing
standard can have a compelling effect on both judges and juries. As
one commentator has noted, jurors "see the seal on the patent, they
hear clear and convincing [evidence], and their likelihood of going for
the defendant is much slighter than it is for the patentee."5 2 The
presumption and standard thus tell a jury that "unless we find
something devastating[ly] effective against it, we're going to affirm
it."'53 As a result, a defendant can never truly rely on a patent being
found invalid. As one patent litigator described, "Patent litigation is
still a pretty uncertain process ... You're never really more than 80
percent sure you're going to win."
54
Referring to the economic model of Part I, the statutory
presumption and the high burden of proving invalidity have an
inflationary effect on the variable p, the probability that the patent is
both infringed and valid. In equation 4, we observed that a nuisance-
value settlement must bear the following relationship top, V, and CD:
NS < [p(V+ CD) + (1-p)(CD)J
Which can be simplified to:
NS < pV + CD
Let us assume a situation where the following values are true:
p=.1
CD = $2 million
V = $10 million
In this case, the upper limit of NS is $3 million. If p increased to
.2, to account for the presumption and burden, NS increases to $4
million. Therefore, the higher the value of p, the higher one can
expect NS to be.
C. The Indeterminate Nature of Claim Construction
Interpretation of the scope of patent claims is a notoriously
indeterminate process. Accordingly, whether or not a defendant's
products actually infringe a patent cannot be known with certainty
Mark A. Lemley, Rethinking Patent Law's Presumption Of Validity, 60 STAN. L. REv. 45, 51
n. 16 (2007).
52. Competition and Intellectual Property Law and Policy in the Knowledge-Based
Economy: Hearing Before the Fed. Trade Comm 'n, 151 (2002) (statement of James Gambrell).
53. Id. at 40.
54. Qualters, supra note 1.
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until litigation is underway. Even in the 19th century, a jurist had
observed:
[N]o property is so uncertain as "patent rights"; no property more
speculative in character or held by a more precarious tenure ... it
is only after a patentee has passed successfully the ordeal of
judicial interpretation that he can speak with any real certainty as
to the scope and character of his invention.
55
In particular, the principle known as the doctrine of equivalents
causes great uncertainty regarding the meaning of patent claim terms.
According to this doctrine, "[t]he scope of a patent is not limited to its
literal terms but instead embraces all equivalents to the claims
described., 56 Since the scope of a patent's claims extends beyond
their literal elements to include unstated equivalents, a defendant who
does not literally infringe a claim may still be liable if the accused
device performs "substantially the same function in substantially the
same way to obtain the same result." 57  Determining what
"substantially" may mean has made contention a permanent fixture of
any allegation of infringement.
Uncertainty in a patent claim's meaning is further aggravated by
an extraordinary rate of reversal of lower court claim constructions by
the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. Scholarly analyses of the
Federal Circuit's review of lower court claim constructions place the
rate of reversal between 35% and 44%. 8 As one Federal Circuit judge
has commented, "the meaning of a claim is not certain (and the
parties are not prepared to settle) until nearly the last step in the
process. 59
The ambiguous nature of patent claim scope is a boon for
nuisance-value patent plaintiffs, because it allows them to file suits
55. E. Bement & Sons v. La Dow, 66 F. 185, 190 (C.C.N.D.N.Y. 1895).
56. Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 732 (2002)
(citing Winans v. Denmead, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 330, 347 (1854).
57. Graver Tank & Mfg Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 608 (1950) (quoting
Sanitary Refrigerator Co. v. Winters, 280 U.S. 30, 42 (1929)).
58. See Kimberly A. Moore, Markman Eight Years Later: Is Claim Construction More
Predictable?, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 231, 233 (2005) (finding a reversal rate of about 35%);
Christian Chu, Empirical Analysis of the Federal Circuit's Claim Construction Trends, 16
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1075, 1104 (2001) (finding a reversal rate of 44%). But see Jeffrey A.
Lefstin, Claim Construction, Appeal, and the Predictability of Interpretive Regimes, 61 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 1033, 1044-45 (2007) (arguing that factors other than legal indeterminacy are
responsible for the rate at which district courts are reversed on claim construction).
59. Cybor Corp. v. Fas Techs. Inc., 138 F.3d 1448, 1476 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (Rader, J.,
dissenting).
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which, though not meritorious enough to prevail at trial and through
appeal, are sufficient to comply with the pre-filing requirements of
Fed. R. of Civ. Pro. 11 (b). 60 According to the Federal Circuit, the
"key factor" in determining whether a patentee has conformed with
1 1(b) is "the presence of an infringement analysis... [which can]
simply consist of a good faith, informed comparison of the claims of a
patent against the accused subject matter., 61 The flexibility and
ambiguity of claim interpretation, along with the liberal requirements
of Rule 11 (b), allow nuisance plaintiffs to cast a wide net to ensnare a
broad range of devices and products.
62
IV. APPROACHES TO THE NUISANCE-VALUE SETTLEMENT
PROBLEM IN THE TORT CONTEXT
The nuisance-value settlement phenomenon in the tort law
context has been recognized in various studies.63 This section draws
upon this work and explores the applicability of prior proposals to the
nuisance settlement problem in patent litigation.
A. Damages Caps
Caps on damages have been the most widely discussed tort
reform proposal in the last few decades. In the field of medical
malpractice for example, several states have enacted the Medical
Injury Compensation Reform Act (MICRA), which was envisioned to
decrease the prevalence of frivolous suits filed against doctors by
capping the amount a medical malpractice plaintiff may collect in
non-economic (pain-and-suffering) damages at $250,000.64 MICRA
60. FED. R. Cry. P. 11(b) (requiring an attorney to certify by her signature that the
pleading or motion being filed is, inter alia, "warranted by existing law" and "the allegations
and other factual contentions have evidentiary support").
61. Q-Pharma, Inc. v. Andrew Jergens Co., 360 F.3d 1295, 1302 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
62. Attorneys for a patent-holding company named Eon-Net were recently sanctioned
under Rule II for filing "dozens" of nearly identical patent infringement complaints where
"indicia of extortion" accompanied demands for nuisance settlements. See Eon-Net, L.P. v.
Flagstar Bancorp, Inc., 239 F.R.D. 609, 619 (W.D. Wash. 2006). As an indicator of how
difficult it is for such sanctions to be sustained, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
summarily vacated the order for sanctions, ruling that "without a full claim construction analysis
it is impossible to assess whether Eon-Net's claim construction was unrealistic." Eon-Net LP v.
Flagstar Bancorp, 249 F. App'x. 189, 196 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
63. For two foundational papers in this field, see D. Rosenberg & S. Shavell, A Model in
Which Suits are Brought for their Nuisance Value, 5 INT'L REV. L. & EcON. 3 (1985) and
Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Suing Solely to Extract a Settlement Offer, 17 J. LEGAL STUD. 437, 437-
50 (1988).
64. See, e.g., CAL. CIv. CODE § 3333.2 (West 1997).
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legislation has been met with a large amount of criticism-much of it
centered around the contention that caps have simply not been
effective in reducing insurance premiums for doctors.65
Regardless of the success in the medical malpractice context,
however, the idea of capping damages is worth considering in the
patent context. As discussed in Part I.B.3, the greater the potential
exposure, V, in a lawsuit, the larger the nuisance settlement, NS, a
defendant will be willing to accept. Conversely, limiting the extent of
V should theoretically decrease the amount NS that a nuisance
plaintiff can demand.
The current Senate and House patent reform bills, S. 1145 and
H.R. 1908, contain "apportionment" provisions aimed at limiting
patent damages awards.66 Specifically, the bills propose that a)
reasonable royalties must be applied only to that economic value
properly attributable to the patent's specific contribution over the
prior art67 and b) unless the patentee shows that the patent's specific
contribution over the prior art is the predominant basis for market
demand for an infringing product or process, damages may not be
based upon the entire market value of that infringing product or
process. 68 These measures, if enacted, could reduce V in nuisance
patent cases, thereby reducing NS. In particular, this proposal might
limit the practice discussed in Part I.B.3 whereby nuisance plaintiffs
target device aggregators rather than device OEM's in order to
implicate a greater royalty base for prospective damages.
One potentially fatal problem with apportionment, however, is
that it may burden litigants and courts with impossibly complex
damages calculations. As Chief Judge Paul Michel of the U.S. Court
of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has observed:
[T]he provision on apportioning damages would require courts to
adjudicate the economic value of the entire prior art, the asserted
patent claims, and also all other features of the accused product or
process whether or not patented. This is a massive undertaking for
which courts are ill-equipped. For one thing, generalist judges tack
65. See, e.g., Geoff Boehm, Debunking Medical Malpractice Myths: Unraveling the
False Premises Behind "Tort Reform," 5 YALE J. HEALTH POL'Y L. & ETHICs 357, 362-65
(2005); Joseph B. Treaster & Joel Brinkley, Behind those Medical Malpractice Rates, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 22, 2005, at CI.
66. Patent Reform Act of 2007, S. 1145, 110th Cong. § 5(a) (2007).
67. Id. § 5(a)(2).
68. Id. § 5(a)(3). Such provisions would limit the effect of the "entire market value rule"
discussed supra in Part I.B.3.
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experience and expertise in making such extensive, complex
economic valuations, as do lay jurors. For another, courts would be
inundated with massive amounts of data, requiring extra weeks of
trial in nearly every case. Resolving the meaning of this novel
language could take years, as could the mandating of proper
methods.
69
Another problem with apportionment is that it is unlikely that a
defendant faced with a nuisance settlement offer can accurately make
the projections necessary to discount V so as to reduce NS.
Apportionment requires an in-depth analysis of the prior art and the
scope of the asserted claims-an analysis which cannot be completed
until litigation is well under way. Moreover, since business managers
often look at decisions in terms of their worst case scenarios, a
prudent risk analyst will be very cautious about reducing V in light of
apportionment. As a result, any reduction in a defendant's calculation
of V will be conservative at best, thereby resulting in very little
discounting effect on the amount, NS, which a nuisance plaintiff can
demand.
B. Fee Shifting
Proponents of tort reform in America often tout the "English
rule" as a means to discourage frivolous nuisance suits. Under this
rule the non-prevailing party pays the winner's attorney's fees, as
well as his own. 70 The "American rule," by contrast, generally
requires each side to bear its own attorney fees. 71 The arguments for
implementing a "loser pays" English rule are manifold, including
basic fairness, incentives for economically reasonable settlements,
and, most importantly, deterrence of non-meritorious nuisance
litigation.7 2
69. Letter from Paul Michel, Chief Judge of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fed.
Circuit, to Patrick Leahy and Orrin G. Hatch, U.S. Senators (May 3, 2007), available at
http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/files/MichelLetter.pdf.
70. See generally Werner Pfennigstorf, The European Experience with Attorney Fee
Shifting, 47 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBs. 37, 37 (1984).
71. See Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 247 (1975).
72. For further elaboration on these arguments, see Gregory A. Hicks, Statutory Damage
Caps Are an Incomplete Reform: A Proposalfor Attorney Fee Shifting in Tort Actions, 49 LA. L.
REV. 763, 782-800 (1989); Howard Greenbergert, The Cost of Justice: An American Problem,
an English Solution, 9 VILL. L. REV. 400, 414 (1964); Charles T. McCormick, Counsel Fees and
Other Expenses of Litigation as an Element of Damages, 15 MINN. L. REV. 619, 622-43 (1931);
Phillip S. Figa, The "American Rule" has Outlived its Usefulness; Adopt the "English Rule,"'
NAT'L L.J., Oct. 20, 1986, at 13, 21-22; and H. Moskowitz & R. Wallace, Loser Pays: A
Deterrent to Frivolous Claims, NEW YORK L.J., March 7, 1996 at 2, 7.
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For this reason, some have argued in recent years that the
English rule should be applied to patent litigation. For example,
Solveig Singleton argues that the English rule in patent suits might
reduce nuisance suits, and "lead patent claimants to be more careful in
filing patents to research non-patent prior art or otherwise bolster the
quality of their claims. '73 Most notably, Jay Kesan has proposed
"one-way, pro-defendant patent fee shifting," which would penalize
patent plaintiffs "when their patent claims are invalidated or revoked
in a litigation or opposition proceeding based on prior art that should
have been discovered by them through a reasonable prior art
search.,
74
Such fee shifting proposals would undoubtedly create incentives
for greater caution before bringing suit on patents of questionable
merit. However, advocates of the American rule put forth two main
rationales for resisting the English rule. According to the fairness
rationale, the justice system should be open to all, and fee shifting
discourages non-wealthy litigants from vindicating their rights.75
According to the administrative complexity rationale, the English rule
is disfavored because of the high administrative costs of determining
the expenses payable by a losing party, the complexity of
apportioning costs when there are multiple defendants, and the
difficulty of allocating responsibility when the party with the actual
financial interest in a losing plaintiffs case is an insurance
company.
76
There are reasons other than fairness and avoidance of
administrative complexity to suspect the efficacy of the English rule
in curbing nuisance patent litigation. We know from Part III that the
statutory presumption of validity, the high evidentiary burden for
invalidating a patent, and the innately unpredictable nature of claim
interpretation are unique features of patent law. Thus, unlike other
legal claims where a plaintiff can know a priori that a claim has no
merit, one can never be equivalently certain that a patent is invalid or
73. Solveig Singleton, Patents and Loser Pays: Why Not?, PROGRESS ON POINT, Feb.
2006, http://www.pff.orglissues-pubs/pops/popl 3.3patentslosers.pdf.
74. Jay P. Kesan, Carrots and Sticks to Create a Better Patent System, 17 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 763, 795 (2002).
75. See, e.g., Philip J. Mause, Winner Takes All: A Re-Examination of the Indemnity
System, 55 IOWA L. REv. 26, 36 (1969); Roxanne Barton Conlin & Clarence L. King, Jr.,
Revisiting the "Loser Pays" Issue: English Rule, NAT'L L.J., Aug. 3, 1992, at 27.
76. See Herbert M. Kritzer, "Loser Pays" Doesn't, LEGAL AFFAIRS, Nov.-Dec. 2005, at
20, 20-21.
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not infringed until the litigation process is complete.17 Stated in the
contrapositive, a legitimate (non-nuisance) patent plaintiff simply
cannot know a priori whether a patent is valid or infringed with
certainty. Thus, a policy that punishes nuisance plaintiffs when a
patent is invalidated or not infringed is over-inclusive because it
punishes legitimate non-nuisance plaintiffs.
Attempts to mitigate the side effects of such over-inclusiveness
are likely to be unfruitful. For example, Kesan suggests that
attorney's fees should only be awarded to defendants when the
"plaintiff is attempting to enforce a patent that he would have realized
is invalid had he conducted a diligent prior art search. 7 8 The
determination of what constitutes a diligent prior art search is a highly
subjective inquiry that would introduce additional uncertainty into the
already-uncertain process of patent litigation. Thus, Kesan's approach
is unlikely to be broadly accepted.
C. Option to Bar Settlement
David Rosenberg and Steven Shavell have proposed an "option
to bar settlement" as a novel solution to the problem of nuisance
litigation.79 Under this proposal, defendants are granted the right to
request a court not to enforce a settlement agreement between the
parties.8° Once the defendant exercises this option, any subsequent
settlements will be unenforceable.81 The effect of this option plays out
as follows: if a defendant knows it is facing a plaintiff who would not
be willing to go to trial (i.e., a nuisance plaintiff), the defendant
exercises the option to bar settlement, which forces the plaintiff to
either pursue the case (and lose) or withdraw. As Rosenberg and
Shavell argue, because a nuisance plaintiff can anticipate this
sequence of events, it will not bring suit in the first place.
82
There are several problems with applying the option to bar
settlement to the patent context. 83 First, the proposal depends on the
77. In our model, this means that p is never zero.
78. Kesan, supra note 74, at 796.
79. David Rosenberg & Steven Shavell, A Solution to the Problem of Nuisance Suits: The
Option to Have the Court Bar Settlement, 26 INT'L. REV. L. & ECON. 42 (2006).
80. Id.
81. Id. at 43.
82. Id.
83. A thorough critique of the option to bar settlement has been provided in Ted
Sichelman, Why Barring Settlement Bars Legitimate Suits: A Reply to Rosenberg and Shavell,
CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y (forthcoming 2008), available at
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defendant recognizing it is facing a plaintiff who is "unwilling to
pursue ... to trial. ' 4 In all litigation, it is difficult to anticipate a
patentee's motivations and strategies. As Lucian Bebchuk observed in
a seminal paper regarding nuisance settlements, "the success of many
[nuisance] suits may be explained.., by defendant uncertainty as to
whether or not the suit is a [nuisance suit]." 85 In patent litigation, it is
particularly difficult for a defendant to recognize that a plaintiff is not
willing to go to trial because even patents with suspicious validity and
claim scope enjoy the benefits of a statutory presumption of validity,
a high evidentiary burden for proving invalidity, and an indeterminate
claim construction process.86
Moreover, unlike other types of suits where defendants may
know with relative ease that a plaintiffs suit has little merit,87 a
determination that a patent is invalid and/or not infringed is a process
that can involve great time, effort, and expense. Even if defendants
were hypothetically able to make this determination, they would have
to simultaneously cope with an inundation of discovery requests that
demand a large expenditure of time and money. At this point, a
defendant must choose between a nuisance-value settlement on the
one hand, and an expensive, though righteous, up-hill battle to
establish patent invalidity and/or non-infringement on the other.
Inevitably, most moderately risk-averse companies would choose the
nuisance settlement rather than the option to bar settlement.
D. Other Proposals
Scholars and policy makers have put forth an astonishing
number of proposals to deal with the problem of frivolous nuisance
litigation. Considering each of these is outside the scope of this paper.
The proposals above are, in my opinion, the most relevant to the
nuisance patent context, but there are a couple of others to which I
will give brief mention.
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=986234. Sichelman focuses on how this
proposal is over-inclusive, discouraging small-stakes, high-cost, but socially beneficial suits. I
refer the reader to this critique, but do not comment at length about it since my intent is to focus
on the specific applicability of Rosenburg and Shavell's proposal to patent litigation, which
Sichelman does not address.
84. Id. at 4.
85. Bebchuk, supra note 63, at 439.
86. See supra Part III.
87. Imagine, for example, a case where a company is sued for breach of contract where it
knows it had a legitimate reason for its actions and the aggrieved party is only bringing the case
for its nuisance value.
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Some advocates have proposed that defendants use the antitrust
laws (including state unfair competition claims) to fire back
counterclaims against nuisance patent plaintiffs.88 Although the
antitrust laws provide potentially powerful weapons to control
socially harmful litigation, they are unsuitable to target nuisance suits.
As Michael Meurer has noted, "[a]ntitrust law does not reach
opportunistic litigation because the purpose of such litigation is to
extract a settlement payment, not to exclude a rival. In antirust
parlance, there is no antitrust injury and no attempt to monopolize a
market., 89 Moreover, since Section 2 of the Sherman Act,90 which
prohibits monopolization of trade, requires market power in the
relevant product market as a prerequisite to a finding of antitrust
injury,91 nuisance plaintiffs, who most often have no ongoing business
operations, 92 cannot implicate antitrust scrutiny.
Randy Kozel and David Rosenberg have proposed a solution
called "mandatory summary judgment," (MSJ), which "preclud[es]
the parties from entering into an enforceable settlement prior to filing
a motion-together with requisite arguments, discovery results, and
other supporting documentation-for merits review on summary
judgment. 93 According to the authors, MSJ "eliminates the potential
payoff from nuisance-value strategies, removing any incentive to
employ them.,
94
Lance McMillan has provided a thoughtful critique of MSJ, in
which his main argument is that "not all cases are suitable for MSJ. A
great many cases, probably the vast majority, are litigated without
ever going through the summary judgment process (e.g., the standard
auto wreck lawsuit). 95 In the context of patent litigation, McMillian's
point resonates even stronger. Approximately 95% of all patent suits
88. See, e.g., Danielle Williams & Steven Gardner, Basic Framework for Effective
Responses to Patent Trolls, IP LINKS, April 2006, at 1, available at
http://www.kilpatrickstockton.com/publications/downloads/IPLinksApril2006.pdf.
89. Michael J. Meurer, Controlling Opportunistic and Anti-Competitive Intellectual
Property Litigation, 44 B.C. L. REV. 509, 539 (2003).
90. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2000).
91. See Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., 504 U.S. 451, 481 (1992)
(enumerating prerequisites to a Section 2 violation).
92. See supra Part I.B.2.
93. Randy J. Kozel & David Rosenberg, Solving the Nuisance- Value Settlement Problem:
Mandatory Summary Judgment, 90 VA. L. REV. 1849, 1860 (2004).
94. Id. at 1853.
95. Lance P. McMillian, The Nuisance Settlement "Problem ": The Elusive Truth and a
Clarifying Proposal, 31 AM. J. TRIAL ADvOC. 221, 269 (2007).
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settle either before or during trial, 78% settle even before the pre-trial
hearing, 16% settle before trial, and 1% settle during trial.96 A
sweeping policy such as MSJ would thus preclude efficient settlement
far too often. By subjecting all patent defendants to the costs of
vigorous litigation on all triable issues, the non-specificity of MSJ
makes it an unworkable option.
V. A NEW PROPOSAL-LEVELING THE PLAYING FIELD ON
DISCOVERY COSTS
A. A Common Flaw in the Tort Approaches
The tort law approaches considered in the previous section are
all premised upon a common assumption, that a nuisance plaintiff
believes its case cannot prevail at trial. 97 Ergo, rational plaintiffs will
be less likely to bring suit if they are penalized for losing (English
rule), if their rewards are minimized (caps on damages), and if the
case is forced to go to trial (option to bar settlement).
The background conditions of patent law impose a different
reality. As observed in Part III, a patent holder is less likely to believe
that its cause of action is entirely frivolous. Nuisance patent plaintiffs
may be highly dubious of infringement and validity,98 but because of
patentee friendly aspects of the law, they are not entirely unwilling to
proceed to trial. I call this the "hybrid frivolousness" of nuisance
patent suits. 99 Any solution to the problem of nuisance-value patent
litigation thus cannot rely on a plaintiff believing his case will be
entirely unsuccessful at trial. Therefore, a proper proposal to combat
nuisance patent litigation should include provisions which deal with
"hybrid frivolousness."
96. Jean 0. Lanjouw & Mark Schankerman, Protecting Intellectual Property Rights: Are
Small Firms Handicapped?, 47 J.L. & ECON. 45, 48, 59 tbl.4 (2004).
97. See, e.g., Kozel & Rozenberg, supra note 93, at 1851 ("[W]e specifically define a
'nuisance-value settlement' as a payoff extracted by a threat to litigate a meritless claim or
defense that both parties know the court would readily dismiss as 'untriable' or otherwise
legally untenable .... ); Rosenberg & Shavell, supra note 79, at I ("[I]n which the plaintiffs
case is sufficiently weak that he would be unwilling to pursue it to trial."); McMillian, supra
note 95, at 254 ("Nuisance cases are defined in this article as any action that the plaintiff knows
to be frivolous yet brings anyway in order to extort a settlement less than the defendant's cost to
defend.").
98. From our definition in Part 1, nuisance patent plaintiffs avoid litigation because of a
"sufficiently high probability" that the asserted claims are invalid or not infringed. Compare this
to the definitions of nuisance suits provided supra in note 97.
99. In terms of our economic model from Part 1, one can imagine that p is somewhere
less than 50%, but not quite zero.
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Beyond the need to cope with the "hybrid frivolousness" of
nuisance patent suits, at least three additional criteria should be
satisfied by proposals to combat nuisance patent litigation. First,
policy solutions should be minimally complex to implement. Patent
litigation is already complex, and proposals like apportionment and
fee shifting, which require additional layers of complexity or judicial
intervention, will defeat the compelling interests in judicial economy.
Second, policy solutions should be narrowly tailored so as to not
prevent efficient settlement in non-nuisance cases. Finally, proposals
should not undermine the substantive rights of patent holders.
Proposals that affect the substantive rights of patent holders, history
shows, will be vigorously opposed and often defeated.'00
B. The Need to Level Specific Imbalances Between CD and Cp
The fundamental imbalance which favors nuisance plaintiffs
over nuisance defendants is plaintiffs' markedly lower projected cost
of litigation. As observed in Part I, nuisance plaintiffs are able to
maximize defendants' litigation costs while minimizing their own,
making Cp smaller than CD. This disparity can be dissected further by
comparing litigation costs in the two main phases of a patent case:
validity and infringement.
With regard to the validity portion of a patent case, nuisance
plaintiffs do not enjoy any overwhelming advantages in cost. Just as a
defendant must retain expert witnesses to opine as to why particular
prior art renders the asserted claims invalid, a plaintiff must retain
experts to opine the opposite. Moreover, when multiple defendants
are sued together they are able to band together in arrangements
known as "common interest groups" or "joint defense groups" in
order to share costs such as the fees of invalidity experts and searches
for prior art.
The infringement portion of a patent case is where nuisance
plaintiffs win their advantage. A patent plaintiff is entitled to request
factual discovery regarding any portion of the defendant's business
operations which might infringe the asserted clams. As discussed
above in Part III.A, the cost of corralling voluminous amounts of
information about allegedly infringing business activities and
responding to broad discovery requests can be staggering. Since
100. See, e.g., Tafas v. Dudas, 511 F. Supp. 2d 652 (E.D. Va. 2007) (granting preliminary
injunction to block the Patent Office's implementation of rules which would curtail inventors'
ability to file continuations during patent applications).
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factual issues relating to infringement are usually not common to
multiple defendants, this cost cannot be amortized in joint defense
agreements. By contrast, nuisance patent plaintiffs rarely have any
business operations of their own, making their exposure to factual
discovery on this front comparably limited.
C. Staying Non-infringement Pending Early Summary
Judgment Motions on Validity
In order to undercut the economic leverage enjoyed by nuisance
plaintiffs, I propose the following: upon motion by a defendant, a
district court will stay all aspects of the case that pertain to
infringement and require the parties to agree to an expedited schedule
for motions on summary judgment of invalidity. Staying the
infringement portion of the case gets to the heart of the advantage
enjoyed by nuisance-value patent plaintiffs because it requires all
parties to focus first on validity, where neither plaintiffs nor
defendants enjoy a particular cost advantage. If a defendant prevails
on summary judgment of invalidity, the case is disposed of, and the
defendant will have avoided the time and expense of discovery
relating to infringement.' 01
Under this proposal, when a defendant is confronted with a
nuisance suit, it will have stronger incentives to quickly examine the
prior art, the prosecution history, and any other evidence that might
invalidate the patent. To the extent that such evidence is unavailing
and the defendant estimates a high likelihood that the asserted claims
are relevant to its business operations, this proposal does not
begrudge settlement as an efficient alternative to litigation. However,
in cases where a defendant gauges that there are strong invalidity
arguments, whether or not its operations might infringe, this proposal
emboldens defendants to litigate rather than accept a nuisance
settlement. Most importantly, because of the stay of discovery on
issues relating to infringement, the defendant can reduce its projected
cost of defense, CD, by conducting its invalidity case unfettered by the
simultaneous costs of responding to discovery requests regarding
infringement.
101. Of course, if the plaintiff seeks an appeal and is successful in reversing summary
judgment, the defendant will not be able to avoid infringement discovery costs. But in that
situation, where the Federal Circuit would find that summary judgment of invalidity was
inappropriate, it is questionable whether the case would actually present a true nuisance suit, as
per the definition in Section IA.
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One primary advantage of the option to stay infringement
discovery pending validity determinations is that it accounts for
"hybrid frivolousness," discussed above. Unlike other approaches
which rely on the plaintiff knowing its case is meritless (or, worse, the
defendant or judge knowing that the plaintiff thinks it is meritless),
this proposal recognizes that nuisance patent plaintiffs often have
inflated views of their case and thus avoids any need for the defendant
to analyze the plaintiffs state of mind. Rather, the focus of this
proposal is the defendant's state of mind regarding the merits of the
suit. A defendant invokes a stay of infringement only if it is
sufficiently confident the case can be disposed of on summary
judgment of invalidity.
Part II discussed how nuisance suits harm the patent system by
preventing bad patents from being vigorously challenged. This
proposal creates the right incentives to combat that harm by allowing
defendants to dispose of a suit without incurring the crippling costs
related to factual discovery on infringement. In terms of the economic
model from Part I, a defendant confronted by a nuisance patent can
lower its estimated cost of defense, CD, thereby reducing the amount
NS which nuisance plaintiffs can demand. As NS gets lower, the
defendants' willingness to litigate against meritless patent claims gets
proportionately higher and the attractiveness to plaintiffs of bringing
nuisance suits gets proportionately lower.
Implementation of this proposal is trivial. Once courts become
aware of the advantages to this approach, they are already
procedurally empowered to liberally grant such stays.'0 2 Requiring
the validity phase to proceed ahead of the infringement phase is
merely a matter of procedure as far as the patent right is concerned.
Thus, since patent holders' substantive rights are not affected by
staying the infringement phase of a case, courts will be able to grant
such stays as a matter of right. Moreover, if the district court finds
that the defendant's motion to stay the infringement phase is entirely
non-meritorious,' 0 3 dilatory, or otherwise improper, the court may
exercise its discretionary powers to deny the motion.
102. Landis v. North Am. Co,, 299 U.S. 248, 254 (1936) ("[T]he power to stay
proceedings is incidental to the power inherent in every court to control the disposition of the
causes on its docket with economy of time and effort for itself, for counsel, and for litigants.").
103. For example, if the district court concludes, after examining the defendant's motion to
stay, that the defendant is unlikely to be able to lay out a prima facie case of invalidity, it can
deny the motion and proceed with a normal discovery schedule.
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This proposal is narrowly tailored. In Part 11, we discussed
several aspects of the patent system which allow nuisance suits to
proliferate. If Congress were to alter the statutory presumption of
validity, the high burden for proving invalidity, or the doctrine of
equivalents with the specific intent of preventing nuisance suits,
legitimate suits would be affected as well. Changes to these
fundamental doctrines should be accomplished while considering
patent litigation as a whole, not merely with an eye to nuisance patent
litigation. Further, from a practical standpoint, attempts to alter
fundamental aspects of patent law will have to overcome stiff
opposition from proponents of strong patent rights.'0 4 Since staying
infringement issues pending validity determinations is purely
procedural, minimal opposition from patent holders can be expected
and adoption of the proposal could be relatively immediate.
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND CAVEATS
Legal systems are built to encourage settlement. As one scholar
has observed, "lawyers, judges, and commentators agree that pretrial
settlement is almost always cheaper, faster, and better than trial.
Much of our civil procedure is justified by the desire to promote
settlement and avoid trial."' 0 5 Any proposal to reduce settlements in
favor of litigation will thus be met with a great deal of institutional
suspicion.
Furthermore, there should be no illusion that any proposal can
entirely eliminate the problem of nuisance settlements in any field.
Corporate defendants are notoriously risk averse, and nuisance
settlements may always be easier to stomach for many companies
than the uncertainty of litigation. In addition, even though courts can
create incentives to litigate against bad patents, innate aversion to trial
attorneys, legal fees, and publicity cannot be lightly disregarded.
The proposal of this Article aims merely to reduce a nuisance
defendant's prospective defense cost estimation, which in turn
104. For examples of pro-patent-rights arguments that oppose comprehensive patent
reform, see John M. Golden, Commentary, "Patent Trolls" and Patent Remedies, 85 TEX. L.
REV. 2111 (2007) (arguing that categorical approaches to patent reform which discriminate
against patent holders will undermine the patent system); James F. McDonough Ill., The Myth of
the Patent Troll: An Alternative View of the Function of Patent Dealers in an Idea Economy, 56
EMORY L.J. 189 (2006) (arguing that "patent dealers" play a vital role in innovation and that the
Congressional patent reform measures will do gravely affect this role).
105. Samuel R. Gross & Kent D. Syverud, Getting to No: A Study of Settlement
Negotiations and the Selection of Cases for Trial, 90 MICH. L. REV. 319, 320 (1991).
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reduces the amount it is willing to accept to settle. As long as
nuisance patent plaintiffs offer small enough settlements, they will
always find takers. However, to the extent that this proposal can
reduce the ability of plaintiffs to extract settlements for bad patents, it
will have achieved its intended goal.
* * *
